Tuesday, April 6, 2010

The following is a article written in response to the academic proposal by Keane. I am planning on submitting this to Thesis XII along with Keane's rebuttal. However, I would like to send this through one last editing phase, and so, if you would like to read this and offer comments, I would be more than happy to read them. Thank you.

The Morality of Meat

Here at the outset, allow me to state what this argument is and what this argument is not. This argument is not a proactive moral justification for eating meat. If indeed such an argument exists, it is not evident to me. This argument is not a condonation of current meat farming practices. This is not an argument about sport. This argument is neither an argument from health nor an argument from taste. This is a relational argument. This is an argument about plants and about animals. This is an argument about life, life that is inherent to all organisms, regardless of species, genus, or phylum; regardless of kingdom.

Factory farming is morally reprehensible. The vegetarian diet is a healthier lifestyle. Killing animals for sport is unjustifiable. The taste of meat is insufficient to justify the killing of an animal. Now allow me to address what the real issue is. Is it, or is it not, morally acceptable to kill an animal for food?

To eat is to kill(1). Let there be no confusion about this point. The meat eater is guilty of no more deaths than the vegetarian. The vegetarian position necessitates a difference between the life of a plant and the life of an animal. This difference must be substantial enough to render killing an animal immoral, and killing a plant moral. What is this difference?

The most common response is quite simple: animals are sentient. Animals possess a nervous system and as a result have the capacity of sensation and therefore the ability to suffer. This is a traditional contrast between plants and animals, though studies at the universities of Berlin, California, and Pennsylvania have discovered evidence to the contrary(2). These studies demonstrate many activities in plants that were previously thought to be exclusive to animals. Plants, though the study was conducted with Brussels sprouts, are lively and actively attempt to remain that way. Most notably, plants react quickly to threats and, amongst other defense mechanisms, release volatile chemicals that both attract larger predators to eat the attackers and warn nearby plants to begin hardening their own defenses.

If plants are sentient, the difference is invalidated. Let us assume for a moment that plants are not sentient, and that these varying mechanisms are mere automata. The fact that animals can feel pain is sufficient moral grounds to not cause pain to animals. I expressed above the reprehensible nature of factory farming, the method by which we currently keep and kill the animals we use for food. Inherent in this claim is the need for a change. Consider then a situation in which we were to give to animals: relatively free range to roam, a long life of pleasure, and a painless death. This would render the sentience of animals, and any other organism then, irrelevant to this debate.

Another common response is that animals are self-conscious. This theory encounters several epistemological problems. The current experiments we employ are inadequate and even then, only a few species have passed them. These tests attract interpretive criticism, by philosophers such as Peter Carruthers(3). Psychologists, such as Jonathan Crystal and Al Foote, have also adamantly criticized the methodology of the experiments(4). Lacking, as it is for the moment, an objective verifiability, self-consciousness in animals cannot be used to advocate for vegetarianism.

This is not a comprehensive refutation of the vegetarian position; there are countless other arguments, and countless other counter-arguments. As animals reliant on the consumption of food, we face a dismal choice: eat animals or eat plants. I have attempted to demonstrate that, if we execute our choice properly, there is no significant moral obligation to choose one over the other. Meat eaters would then inherit a difficult burden to demonstrate a practical method by which we can provide the necessary requirements (i.e. painless death, good life) that would justify the killing of an animal. Until such a method is implemented, the meat-eater must refrain from carnivorous behavior. However, there is no absolute and moral reason to not, under any circumstances, consume meat.

-Jacob Wheeler

(1): There are diets to which this is inaccurate: fruitarians will eat only fruit, therefore not killing the plant.
(2): http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/22/science/22angi.html?_r=2
(3): Carruthers, P. (2009). “Meta-cognition in Animals: A Skeptical Look,” Mind & Language, 23: 58–89.
(4): Crystal, J.D. and Foote, A.L. (2009). “Metacognition in animals,” Comparative Cognition & Behavior Reviews, 4: 1–16.

Wednesday, March 3, 2010

A Contextual Clarification

This is a response for Brendon, but I encourage any and all others to also read and comment. This conversation began with his post: Knowledge vs Wisdom and Preference vs Objectivity. I responded to that post with A Modest Inquiry. He responded by commenting on that post four times, and now, I answer him. If you are interested in reading this conversation, it is extremely interesting and I encourage it, though, of course, I do not expect it.

Brendon, you have provided me with too much information to go through line by line without writing a novel :) So instead I will address what I think is the more important aspects of my disagreement. I appreciate, by the way, that you welcome such skepticism and do not react negatively. I thank you for that. To begin, I submit a portion of your latest response:
"...you get caught up in the words and you loose the wisdom that i am trying to tap into. you search your mind for areas that these words have been referenced in your experience, but that hinders your growth because you are unwilling to accept my redefinitions because i do not have the credentials"
I do get caught up in the words. I know that there is supposedly a higher wisdom, but the words are all that I have to rely on so yes, I dogmatically insist that they be, at least, internally consistent. Yes there is a spirit to the words but when the words do nothing to help convey this spirit, you might as well rely on using your pineal gland telepathy.
I would be willing to accept your redefinitions, on the one condition that you explicitly provide them. You do not redefine words. You simply use them in previously incorrect ways without taking due time to explain that there has been a change. Many philosophers change definitions or invent new words, but when they do they typically (with the exception of Husserl and Heidegger) provide the new definitions prior to using them.

My main problem is not with your philosophy, not with the conclusions you reach. Though yes, I am very skeptical. My problem is with your method of explanation and articulation. You consistently use language in new ways, as expressed above, and you perpetually rely on words and phrases that are saturated with vagueness and ambiguity. Yes, clear, precise words are confining, but there is a virtue in that: it makes them understandable.

Thursday, February 11, 2010

A Definitive Downfall

It is disturbing, I think, that last class it took an hour, despite that I asked for this at the beginning, to begin to define the terms, an activity we did not complete (Yes I looked at the clock). So, in an effort to perhaps save time next class, I am going to posit here definitions of the two realms of thought. I mean these to be neither accurate nor final, merely the impressions I got listening to Johnson and reading the paper he assigned.

Naturalism: The worldview that relies only on natural elements and forces, excluding the supernatural or spiritual, to explain the mechanisms of reality. (Though linked strongly, not synonymous with empiricism)

Supernaturalism: The worldview that uses non verifiable explanations in augmentation of, though not necessarily in lieu of, natural elements and forces. Though it is much more common, supernaturalism requires no more faith than does naturalism. (It could be as simple as believing a person relaying a supernatural explanation to you)

They do not seem as contradictory as most people were making them out to be. Deism strikes a hard example given that it is a belief that there are natural laws and no supernatural forces are currently at work. Deism is as much a proponent of empiricism as atheism tends to be.

Are my definitions sufficient or are they missing something important?

Friday, February 5, 2010

A Modest Inquiry

Re: Knowledge vs Wisdom and Preference vs Objectivity

I find it a rather sensational absolute claim that wisdom is a divine experience, for I can discern no moment of ascendancy from a secular experience to a possibly divine counterpart. I also think it improbable, presupposing the previous claim to be true, that every word we utter is an attempt to tap into that wisdom. "Hey Brendon, can you hand me that cup?" Is the attempt to tap into wisdom a subconscious act, one with which I am unaware? For my only intent with that statement was to have you give me the cup.

"Every word that comes out of our mouth is an attempt to tap into this wisdom...The mind is only interested in knowledge..." Words are necessarily predicated upon the existence of a mind. Words are not sentient. They have no intention beyond that which is bestowed by the active mind from whence they originated. If the mind is not interested in wisdom, neither can the words. Becky brought up a good point. To which ego are you referring and how and when does it disappear?

"Wisdom is instant...[wisdom] grows in your heart." Though, these statement seem contradictory, it is possible that I misinterpreted the language. How does wisdom generate innocence? On what objective basis is innocence determined and where is the causal link between the two qualities?

Before we judge whether or not wisdom taps into a metaphysical reality behind all existence, should we not demonstrate the existence of such a metaphysical reality? Is this not a necessary preliminary step?

"[Wisdom] is without qualities." "Wisdom is instant...wisdom is a divine experience...wisdom is intrinsically true." Instantaneous, divine, true...all qualities. (You have used the word feminine, in both class and on your blog in constantly varying contexts with which I can find no corroborating definition. Could you clarify?)

Words are indicators of what?

Words are dangerous because people believe what they say and they miss the spirit. I understand that words are often inadequate to fully address the intentions of the speaker. While language is an imperfect tool, it is the most effective one we have. It is necessary to understand what the words say. Absent this step, it would be impossible to ascertain the spirit.


Within philosophical discourse, every claim requires due articulation, explanation, and justification. A claim absent these co-requisites denies both motivation and adequate means to further explore and interpret the ideas of the author. These virtues of discourse are not luxuries to which we aspire; they are the necessities of effective communication.

Tuesday, January 26, 2010

Coherence as Correspondance

It struck me in class on Monday, that despite the seemingly large divide between the two theories, they are not entirely contradictory.

The correspondence theory states that a claim is true if it corresponds to reality, a theory that has the added benefit of being rather intuitive and commonsensical.

The coherence theory states that a claim is true if it does not contradict, or works well with, previously posited statements. As more claims are added, the complexity of the system of statements increases and so too does the likelihood that these claims are true.

It seems that if we combine the two, we get an adequate definition of truth, and the best way to ascertain truthfulness. Professor Johnson reminded us that the method for ascertaining truthfulness is a separate issue than the definition of truth, which is what we were dealing with. So if truth is that which corresponds to reality, than the best way to determine if a statement corresponds with reality is to compare it to previously posited statements that are thought to be true (Sense experience, after all, is notoriously unreliable). As more claims are compared, the complexity will grow and so too will the likelihood that they correspond to reality.

Question: (1)Does this synthesis do justice to each of the theories? (2) Do you think this synthesis works and makes sense?